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Abstract
This paper provides a rich assessment of the demand characteristics for movie theatre
attendance in two major metropolitan markets and provides strong support for the
importance of spatial characteristics in empirical demand analysis. We provide evidence
of the usual competitive effect of location on an exhibitor’s demand but also find
evidence of a clustering effect:  when a group of theatres is in close proximity to each
other, their proximity generates additional demand for all theatres within the cluster.  The
demographic evidence suggests that movie attendance is a normal good but does not
support the commonly held industry view that young male viewers drive demand.
Finally, we show that attendance at a particular theatre is affected by both the theatre’s
attributes and the attributes of nearby competing theatres. The attributes we include cover
physical features and theatre type.
JEL Classifications:  L11, D43, L82
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Economic analysis is fundamentally based on a careful specification of the factors that
influence consumer behavior across and within industries.  In this paper we use new and
complete data drawn from two major metropolitan markets to analyze the empirical
determinants of the demand for the movie-going experience in the U.S. theatrical
exhibition market.  Our study makes five important contributions to empirical demand
analysis.
First, we develop a model of consumer behavior that identifies a general process
by which consumers choose among products with differentiated attributes.  Specifically,
we develop a two-stage model of consumer choice.  In the first stage, a consumer with
particular demographic characteristics decides to purchase from a particular product
group, for example, to go to a movie in a particular geographic region, based upon the
relative desirability of that product group.  In the second stage, conditional upon the
decision to purchase, the consumer chooses a particular product, for example, to attend a
particular movie theatre within the region, based upon the relative spatial and physical
attributes of the products within the group selected in the first stage.
Second, we carefully document the evolution of demand patterns in an industry
characterized by some degree of capacity consolidation.  The total number of movie
theatres in our sample regions declined slightly while the total number of screens
increased over the period 1996-2002. This pattern suggests that clustering, both in the
form of intra-company consolidation and expansion of capacity, and inter-firm proximal
location choice, may have become increasingly important to consumer choice.   We find
that when the spatial nature of competition is carefully measured, the demand at a given
theatre increases with distance to the nearest neighbor of the same type but decreases3
with distance to the next-nearest neighbor.  This finding is consistent with the more
general spatial demand phenomenon that equilibrium outcomes are determined by a
trade-off between negative competition effects and positive market-share effects.
1
Third, we analyze the importance of product attributes and relative product
differentiation in conjunction with the influence of spatial characteristics, to estimate a
multi-dimensional model of demand.  We find that theatre characteristics, such as
stadium seating and digital sound systems, can influence demand depending upon the
presence or absence of these attributes relative to neighboring – and so competing –
theatres.
Fourth, our extensive demographic data allow us to explore the impact that
specific demographic features, such as age, income and gender have on demand.  We
find, in particular, that movie attendance is a normal good, as might have been expected.
By contrast, the evidence does not support the long-held industry view that young male
viewers drive demand.
Finally, we estimate demand over a five-year period for this industry, taking
explicit account of the possibility that there might be spatial autocorrelation in the data.
This analysis provides a new and interesting example of the implementation of and
testing for spatial correlation in errors.
In sum, our theoretical and empirical analysis of demand in a dominant U.S.
industry sheds light on several fundamental questions relating to consumer choice when
products are spatially and physically differentiated and when consumers are
heterogeneous.  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section I develops
our two-stage model of consumer demand.  Section II describes the data.  Section III
                                                
1 See, for example, Fujita, Krugman and Venables (2001).4
presents the empirical implementation and results.  Our concluding remarks follow in the
final section.
I A Model of Consumer Demand for Movie Attendance
We model the decision of whether and where to view a movie as a discrete choice
problem expressed over differentiated products.
2  To model the demand for attendance at
a movie offered by a particular movie theatre we need to take account of variation in
individual tastes, variation in the product characteristics offered by different theatres (for
example, stadium seating, digital sound) and in the spatial characteristics (locations) of
the competing theatres.  The first two sources of variation in individual demands raise
issues that we consider below but that are reasonably familiar.  The third source of
variation has distinctly spatial aspects that require careful treatment.
Our primary interest in this paper is in the determinants of consumer demand for
attendance at particular movie theatres.  As a result, we take the location decisions of the
individual movie theatres as exogenous.  However, we can still draw on developments in
location theory and economic geography to analyze how consumers make consumption
decisions among these competing theatres.  The literature suggests that two opposing
effects determine the location decision and, for given location decisions, determine the
demand decision.  On the one hand, firms want to locate reasonably close to each other in
either product or characteristics space in order to create an attractive cluster of products
that will attract consumers.  This has been termed the market-share effect by Pinkse and
Slade (1998).   On the other hand, firms do not want to locate too close to their immediate
                                                
2  See Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (1992) for an excellent review and development of discrete
choice models of this type.5
competitors because this leads to strong local competition.  Netz and Taylor (2002) refer
to this as the market-power effect but we prefer to refer to it as a competition effect.
One method for capturing the impact of these two effects on demand is to use the
two-stage nested process first developed by Ben-Akiva (1973).  First assume that the
population of potential consumers can be partitioned into J subsets according to some
potentially observable demographic variables that influence demand: age, income and
education are obvious candidates.  For consumers of a particular type j in J we assume
that their choice set M (the set of movie theatres) can be partitioned into L subsets Ml,
where each subset contains movie theatres with some observable characteristics in
common.  In order to capture the market-share effect described above, the obvious
characteristic to choose is a measure of the individual theatre’s location relative to its
competitors.
An individual consumer is assumed to follow a two-stage process.  First, she
chooses the subset from which she will consume with a probability determined by the
attractiveness of the subset to her.  She then chooses a particular alternative (theatre)
from within that subset with a probability determined by the utility offered by that
alternative relative to those of its competitors within the subset.  In both stages we
assume that choice is based on a multinomial logit model.
Suppose that a consumer of type j has chosen subset Ml in the first stage and that
the utility she obtains from attending movie theatre m in subset Ml is:
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The choice of subset Ml in the first stage is determined by the utility offered by
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where µ1 is a positive constant.  Putting (2) and (4) together, we have that the probability
of consumer of type j attending movie theatre m∈ Ml ∈ M is
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and this movie’s expected revenues are  .
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3  See Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (1992) p. 40 for a more extensive discussion.7
In (5) the market-share effect is captured by the first term,  essentially by the
attractiveness of a particular subset of theatres, while the competition effect is captured
by the second term, the relative attractiveness of a particular movie theatre within the
relevant cluster.
We can further refine this analysis if we assume that consumers behave according
to a linear random utility model.  Take a particular subset Ml and consumer type j.
Assume that the characteristic distinguishing consumer types is income and that
consumers of type j have real income yj.   Further assume that the conditional indirect
utility that a consumer of type j obtains from attending movie theatre m ∈ Ml is:
() l jm jm m j
j
m M m J j a p y V ∈ ∈ ε + + − = ;
~
(7)
where the ajm provide observable indices of the attractiveness of theatre m  ∈  Ml to
consumers of type j.  Anderson et al. (op. cit.) show that we can recover the utility
functions ujm from these indirect utility functions.  With respect to expected demand, (7)
then implies that we can replace the terms uji in equations (2), (3) and (5) with the terms
aji – pi.
The direct implication of the above analysis is that a multi-stage decision-making
process on the part of consumers determines revenues for a particular movie theatre.
First, a consumer decides whether or not to “buy” movie attendance.  Given that we
assume movie prices to be exogenous, a perfectly reasonable assumption given our data
set, this decision will be determined essentially by consumer characteristics or
demographics.  Then the consumer decides which movie theatre to attend.  The two-stage
nested approach detailed above suggests that this decision balances the market-share and
competition effects.8
Given the nature of our data, a particularly appealing measure of the
attractiveness of a particular group of movie theatres, and so of the market-share effect, is
the geographic extent of the theatres in a particular cluster: the more spread out they are,
the less attractive they are as a cluster.  This suggests one of two possible approaches.
We could follow Netz and Taylor (2002) and measure the number of movie theatres or
movie screens within some defined distance of the particular theatre we are considering.
The problem that arises here is that the appropriate distance is an empirical matter.  As a
result, we take a more direct approach by assuming that a theatre, its nearest competitor
and its second-closest neighbor create the clustering effect.
4  The implicit assumption is
that the potential demand for a particular theatre in a cluster is inversely related to the
distance between the theatre under consideration and its second-nearest competitor.
The competition effect is, from (2) and (7), the result of two forces.  First, there is
a direct competition effect that we can represent as the distance between movie theatre m
and its nearest competitor.  Second, there is an indirect competition effect determined by
the characteristics ajm of theatre m relative to those of its nearest competitor.   There is
likely to be some asymmetry in the impact of movie theatre attributes on consumer
demand.  For example, the impact on demand of offering stadium seating when the
nearest competitor does not need not be equivalent to the impact on demand of a theatre
not offering stadium seating when the nearest competitor does.  This is a point to which
we return in our discussion of the empirical implementation and results.
As a result, the model that we estimate can be written:
i i i i i i Z MS IC DC R ε + ζ + δ + γ + β + α = (8)
                                                
4  This implicitly assumes that there is a reasonably strong distance decay effect on demand.9
In (8), Ri measures demand for attendance at movie theatre i, DCi is a measure of the
direct competition that movie theatre i faces, while ICi measures indirect competition
determined by differences in characteristics of theatre i and its direct competitor(s).  MSi
measures the market-share effect and Zi measures the demographic and other variables
that are likely to affect individual demand for movie attendance.
One technical problem that might arise in estimating (8) is that the error term for
movie theatre m may be correlated with that of movie theatre n if these theatres are
located close to each other.  Such theatres offer very similar products and have
substantially overlapping potential markets.  Exogenous changes in the market
environment not captured by the regressors in (8) may well, as a result, appear in the
error terms for the two theatres.  We adopt a method that is standard in the literature
5 by
applying a spatial error correction model in which the error term is written
i i i η ε λ ε+ = W (9)
In (9), ε is a vector of errors for all the movie theatres in our sample, λ is the residual
spatial autocorrelation coefficient, W is a symmetric MxM weighting matrix and η is an
independently, normally distributed error term with constant variance.  The weighting
matrix captures the degree of correlation across observations, which we can take to be
inversely related to the distance between theatres.  A convenient measure of wij is zero
when i = j and the negative exponential of the distance between movie theatre i and
movie theatre j when i ≠ j, reflecting the idea that spatial autocorrelation should decline
more than proportionately with distance.
                                                
5  See Netz and Taylor (2002).10
II Data Description
The current study examines the demand conditions in two major metropolitan markets:
Boston and South Florida.  The specific boundaries of these areas were established by
Census Metropolitan and Surrounding Area (MSA) classifications.  The estimated 2000
population of the Boston MSA was 5,927,382, with 2,269,608 households, and an
average household income of $69,836.  The population of the South Florida region was
4,726,491, with 1,841,057 households, and an average household income of $57,658.
The South Florida region comprises the Fort Lauderdale, Miami, and West Palm Beach-
Boca Raton MSAs.  The Boston and South Florida markets were selected because of their
similar population and household sizes, but regional demographic differences.
The two markets were also chosen because of similarities in their motion-pictures
exhibition market characteristics, but apparent differences in evolutionary dynamics.  By
the end of 2000, the Boston and South Florida markets comprised 63 and 67 movie
theatres, respectively.  However, in 1996 the Boston market included only 59 theatres,
whereas the South Florida market included 72 theatres (See Table 1).
Specifically, in the Boston market, between 1996 and 2000, five theatres closed
and nine theatres opened, with the average number of screens per theatre increasing from
6.68 to 8.10, an increase of 21%.  In the South Florida market, during the same time
period, 18 theatres closed and 13 theatres opened, with the average number of screens per
theatre increasing from 8.72 to 10.85, an increase of 23%.   The population per screen
during this time period decreased in Boston from 15,044 to 11,622, whereas the
population per screen held steady at 6,770 in South Florida.  In 2000, attendance per
screen in Boston and South Florida was 40,754, and 38,063, respectively.  In 1996,11
14.4% of Boston screens had stadium seating, increasing to 36.6% in 2000.  In 1996,
23.4% of South Florida screens had stadium seating, increasing to 53.9% in 2000.  Thus,
while similar in size, these two markets have experienced markedly different changes in
exit and entry patterns and adoption of innovative theatre attributes.
III. Empirical Analysis
To estimate the demand function for movies, we begin with a straightforward demand
specification.  We propose that film attendance at theatre i is determined by a vector of
theatre characteristics, which include the direct, indirect, market-share, and demographic
effects described in the model developed above.   In particular, attendance will be
influenced by the number of screens at that theatre, the distance of the theatre to
neighboring theatres, the seating and sound attributes of the theatre, and a variety of
demographic characteristics of the market surrounding the theatre.  The number of
screens at a given theatre is a measure of product quality: the greater the number of
screens the wider the variety of movies that are likely to be shown.  The distance to
neighboring theatres reflects the availability of substitutes and potential clustering effects.
The physical features of the theatre potentially draw consumers to one theatre rather than
another and demographic characteristics reflect consumer ability and willingness to pay
to attend movies.
We expect attendance to increase with the number of screens and the distance to
the nearest competing theatre.  If a clustering or market-share effect exists among groups
of theatres, we expect attendance to be inversely related to the distance to the second-
closest theatre.  Further, attendance should increase with income and population density12
as measured by number of households in the vicinity of a given theatre.  The impact on
demand of theatre characteristics such as stadium seating and digital sound is likely to be
less straightforward.  On the one hand, these features might increase demand overall by
improving the quality of the movie-going experience.  On the other hand, they might
affect demand at a particular theatre because of that theatre’s superior characteristics
relative to its competitors.
A.  Empirical Implementation.
We begin our empirical demand analysis with an ordinary least squares estimation of the
tickets per screen sold by a theatre as a function of that theatre's attributes, or:
Q = X ε β+ (10)
Demand is measured by the number of tickets sold per screen annually, with the
observations presented in Q, an Nx1 vector.  Theatre attributes are contained in X, an NxK
vector.  The vector ε contains error terms that we assume to be normally distributed and
independent.
As a baseline, we estimate the following equation, checking first for the possible
presence of heteroskedacticity in the error terms:
TIXPERSCREENi = B0 + B1SCREENSi + B2DISTANCE1i + B3DISTANCE2i +
B4DISTANCE3i + B5HOUSEHOLDSi+ B6MEAN AGEi + B7MEAN INCOMEi +
B8ENTRYi + B9EXITi + εi (11)
The estimation uses data from both the Boston and South Florida markets in the
year 2000.   TIXPERSCREENi measures the total number of tickets sold per screen at the13
ith theatre in 2000.
6   SCREENSi measures the number of screens available at a given
theatre.  The DISTANCEJi variables capture the distance to the first-, second-, and third-
closest movie theatre to the ith theatre.  The present analysis focuses on the demand for
movies at first-run, second-run, and arthouse theatres.  We report results separately for
cases in which distances are measured to theatres of the same type and to theatres of any
type.  HOUSEHOLDSi,  MEAN AGEi, and MEAN INCOMEi,  measure the number of
households, the mean age, and mean income, respectively, within three-, five-, and ten-
mile radii of the ith theatre, with these data drawn from the 2001 Census estimates.
ENTRYi and EXITi are dummy variables that equal one if a theatre experienced an
entry or an exit event, respectively, during 2000, and zero otherwise.  An entry event is
defined as a new theatre opening, or an existing theatre re-opening after a period of not
operating.  A theatre can re-open under new ownership or re-open following a
renovation, or both.  An exit event is defined as a theatre closing, either permanently or
temporarily, due to an anticipated change of ownership or a renovation project.  The
purpose of including these two variables is to control for missing months of revenue data
by identifying the events that would lead to a bias towards under-reported revenues.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for our sample and Table 3 presents the
results of the estimation of (11).  The Breusch-Pagan statistics indicate the presence of
heteroskedasticity and the reported results correct for this.
We next extend our baseline analysis to test for the presence of spatially
autocorrelated error terms.  The model in this case can be written as:
                                                
6 The total number of tickets sold was determined by dividing a theatre's total annual revenues by the
average ticket price in the corresponding market.14
Q = X ε β+ (12)
with
η + ε λ = ε W (13)
Now the vector η contains normally distributed, independent error terms, and the scalar
λ  detects the presence of spatial autocorrelation, if any.  Solving for ε  yields:
( = ε I-λ W)
-1 η (14)
Thus, we re-estimate Equation 11 using maximum likelihood estimation, replacing the
error term εi with the spatial autocorrelation correction in Equation 14.
7  The results of
this estimation are presented in Table 4.  Since the spatial autocorrelation coefficient λ
does not differ significantly from zero, the results need not be corrected for spatially
correlated errors.  Thus we focus on the results presented in Table 3.
B.  Empirical Results.
A particularly noteworthy result captured in the analysis of spatial demand relationships
among theatres of the same type in Table 3 is that the distance to the closest theatre
(DISTANCE1) has a significant and positive impact on attendance, while the distance to
the second-closest theatre (DISTANCE2) has a significant and negative  impact on
attendance.  The first result supports the hypothesis that the distance to the nearest theatre
reflects the degree of substitutability of one theatre for the next:  the further the next
theatre from theatre i, the less substitutable attendance at the next theatre is for theatre i,
and so the greater the attendance at theatre i.  This is the usual demand effect that we
                                                
7 We employ Luc Anselin's SpaceStat to estimate spatial effects.  Our weights matrix uses the negative
exponential of the distance between theatres i and j, with zeros along the diagonal.  This weights matrix is15
would expect, representative of the direct competition effect, or market-power effect,
described in our theoretical model.  The second result indicates that the closer the second-
closest theatre of the same type is to theatre i, the higher theatre i's attendance will be.
This provides evidence of important clustering effects, reflective of the market-share
effect described in the model.
8
Neither the direct competition effect nor the market-share effect are significant
when theatre i's location is considered relative to any theatre type, suggesting that
competitive and complementary demand effects occur among products with similar
attributes but not across product groups.  This suggests that grouping theatres into
markets by classification (e.g., first-run, second-run) yields well-defined “nests”.
The results in Table 3 also indicate that SCREENS, HOUSEHOLDS, and MEAN
INCOME, are positive and significant at the .01 or .05 levels in all of the regressions.
The number of screens impacts attendance even though the dependent variable,
TIXPERSCREEN, measures per-screen rather than total theatre attendance.  In other
words, the SCREENS effect is capturing a factor influencing demand beyond the pure
volume effect on revenues that a theatre with a larger number of screens should enjoy.
Simply put, the result on SCREENS supports the hypothesis that movie attendance at a
given theatre will increase if the theatre offers greater product variety.   The demographic
variables indicate that attendance increases with population density, a straightforward
volume effect, and income, suggesting that movies are normal goods.
                                                                                                                                                
then row-standardized such that the sum of the weights in each row equals 1, following the methodology
presented in Netz and Taylor (2002).16
C.  The Clustering Effect and Regional Malls.
Since theatres are often located near regional malls, it is tempting to suggest that our
distance parameters are acting as surrogates for the potentially positive impact on demand
of nearness to a mall.
9  There are good reasons for rejecting this hypothesis in favor of the
more direct hypothesis that, even given the competition and market-share effects, the
presence of a mall should increase demand.  In particular, the former hypothesis might be
consistent with the sign on the DISTANCE1 parameter but is not consistent with the sign
on the DISTANCE2 parameter.
10  Nevertheless, it is reasonable to check whether or not
the impact of the distance parameters disappears once we account for the presence of a
regional mall.  To test this hypothesis, we construct a new variable, MALL, equal to one if
a regional mall is within a 2-mile radius of a given theatre, and zero otherwise.  We then
repeat the tests in Table 3 adding MALL to each regression.  The results are presented in
Table 5.
We find that MALL does, indeed, have a positive influence on film attendance, but
this is significant at the .10 level or better in only three out of six of the regressions.
Moreover, controlling for the presence of malls has no impact on the sign or significance
of the DISTANCE1 and DISTANCE2 parameters.  Thus, while there might be a “mall
effect” on demand, this should be seen as distinct and separate from the market-share and
competition effects that we have identified.
                                                                                                                                                
8 Note that this interpretation implicitly treats the relevant market as radial in nature.  See Ben-Akiva, De
Palma, and Thisse (1989).  Note also that, given the cross-sectional nature of our data for any given year,
the theatre location choices can be taken as given in that year.
9  We are grateful to William Klemperer and Jonathan Taylor for drawing this to our attention.
10  The reasoning is that the greater the distance to the nth nearest neighbor the more likely is it that there
will be a regional mall within the same distance.17
D.  Demand Over Time.
We now turn to estimating demand for the movie-going experience for each year from
1996 through 1999.  In each case we repeat the core regression analysis of Equation 11.
11
In Table 6, we correct for heteroskedasticity.  In Table 7, we control for possible spatial
autocorrelation.  Since the spatial autocorrelation coefficient does not differ significantly
from zero in any of these regressions, we focus on the results presented in Table 6.
The results for 1999 have much in common with those for 2000.  Movie
attendance is positively related to the number of screens, households and income, and the
distance parameters capturing the competition and market-share effects behave in much
the same manner as in 2000.   By contrast, over the 1996 through 1998 periods the only
consistently significant predictors of demand are the numbers of households in the
vicinity of the theatres, income levels, and whether or not a theatre experienced an entry
event.
These results suggest that as the industry evolved during the late 1990s, the
importance of the competition and market-share effects and of product variety (as
measured by the number of screens) increased over time.  One possible explanation for
this change in demand behavior can be found from careful examination of Table 1,
documenting industry capacity changes during the period of study.  The general trend in
both the Boston and South Florida markets was towards an increase in the number of
screens at a given theatre and a general rise in the proportion of megaplex theatres.  As a
result, when a consumer chose to go to the movies in the later part of our study period,
                                                
11 Note that MALL is excluded from the analysis, since mall location data were available for only 2000.
More generally, we think that this year-by-year approach is more appropriate than constructing a matched
panel for the complete period, since our demographic data are drawn from Census data covering a single
year.18
she was consuming a product with arguably superior physical and quality attributes than
in the earlier part of the period.  Now a visit to the movies involves a choice of a film
from among a much wider range of product offerings in a more custom-designed space.
The rise in the importance of the number of screens can thus be explained by these
industry-wide changes in the characteristics of the product on offer.
Moreover, we would argue that the same industry evolution led to a strengthening
of both the competition and market-share effects in the later years of our study.  An
increase in the average number of screens per theatre has two effects.  First, we should
see increased overlap in the films being shown at neighboring theatres, strengthening the
competition effect.
12 Second, the size, as measured by screens, of any three-theatre
cluster also increases, increasing the critical mass of products (movies) being offered by
any group of theatres and so increasing the attractiveness of each cluster, strengthening
the market-share effect.
E.  Relative Product Characteristics.
We next extend our analysis to consider how demand for movie attendance is affected by
the specific product characteristics of individual theatres.  In doing so we focus our
attention on the sound features and on the type of seating of the individual theatres. As
we noted above, these characteristics can be expected to affect demand in one of two
ways.  First, there is a direct effect through an overall increase in product quality.
Second, there is a comparative effect determined by the presence or absence of a
particular characteristic relative to a theatre’s competitors.
                                                
12  Analysis of weekly film schedules for a sample of first-run theatres in the Boston area in 2000 shows
that there is considerable overlap in the film schedules of neighboring first-run theatres.19
We test for the first, direct effect by introducing the dummy variables DIGITAL,
DOLBY, and STADIUM, which equal one if a theatre offers digital sound, Dolby sound,
and stadium seating, respectively, and zero otherwise.  To test for the second,
comparative effect we introduce the attribute comparison variables DIGITAL
COMPARISON, DOLBY COMPARISON, and STADIUM COMPARISON. Consider, for
example, DIGITAL COMPARISON.  A given theatre's sound attributes are compared to
its closest neighbor's.  If this theatre offers digital sound and its neighbor does not, the
comparison variable equals 1, reflecting a potentially positive competitive advantage of
offering a product feature when the nearest competitor does not do the same.  If both
theatres offer digital sound or if neither offers digital sound, the comparison variable
equals 0, reflecting neither a competitive advantage nor disadvantage with regards to the
digital sound attribute.  And if a given theatre does not offer digital sound when its
nearest neighbor does so, the comparison variable equals -1, capturing the potential
relative disadvantage the given theatre experiences with regards to the digital sound
attribute.  The definitions are analogous for DOLBY COMPARISON and STADIUM
COMPARISON.
We begin by repeating the core estimation of Equation 11 and exploring the
impact of the presence of digital sound on attendance.
13  The results for 1999 and 2000,
comparing a theatre's attributes to the nearest neighbor of any type, are presented in Table
8.
14  In 1999, the direct and comparative effects of digital sound on movie attendance
                                                
13 We do not examine digital sound and stadium seating simultaneously, since we anticipate possible
multicollinearity between DIGITAL and STADIUM.  Both product attributes are relatively new innovations
and quite often appear simultaneously at a given theatre.  Similarly, ENTRY, EXIT, and MALL were
excluded from the regressions due to possible multicollinearity with the attributes dummy variables.
14 We limit our analysis to 1999 and 2000 since theatres closed or were renovated during our period of
study and previous theatrical attributes cannot be confirmed.20
were both positive and significant.  By contrast, in 2000 only the direct effect of digital
sound was significant, the comparative effect had essentially disappeared.  While these
results reflect only two years of industrial evolution, they provide a provocative snapshot
of the strategic importance of competitive adoption of a new technology.  Digital sound
not only improves the overall quality of the movie-going experience, it also offers
theatres a competitive edge.  As the innovation becomes more widely adopted, the
strategic importance of the new technology diminishes, with only the general demand-
enhancing effects of the attribute remaining.
This interpretation is supported by our analysis of Dolby sound.  When the results
in Table 8 were repeated using Dolby sound variables, neither DOLBY  nor  DOLBY
COMPARISON was significant in either year.  Since the Dolby stereo technology was
introduced in the mid-1970s, it is reasonable that any competitive advantage based on this
attribute would have been fully realized by the late 1990s.  Indeed, it is reasonable to
suggest that as the industry evolves, the presence of an older technology such as Dolby
sound might actually have a negative impact on attendance, since its presence serves as a
signal to consumers of a generally lower-quality and outdated theatre-going experience.
In fact, while statistically insignificant, the sign on DOLBY was negative in 1999 and the
sign on DOLBY COMPARISON was negative in both 1999 and 2000.
A slightly different pattern emerges when we replace digital sound with stadium
seating in the analysis.  STADIUM COMPARISON was positive and significant in 1999
while STADIUM was statistically insignificant.  In 2000, neither stadium seating measure
was significant.  The suggestion in this case is that, although seating type has little impact21
on overall demand, theatres have a strategic motivation to incur the expense of installing
stadium seating, a typical prisoners’ dilemma outcome.
When the regressions in Table 8 are repeated changing the attribute comparisons
to the nearest neighbor of the same type, instead of any type, the DIGITAL dummy
remains positive and significant but all other dummies are insignificant.  This suggests
that the advanced sound characteristics of movie theatres are, indeed, valued by
consumers more than, for example, seating attributes.  There is the further suggestion that
product attributes matter across different products (i.e., across theatre type), whereas our
earlier analysis of spatial characteristics demonstrated their importance within product
classes (i.e., among same theatre types, but not across theatre types).
 
F.  Extended Demographic Analysis.
The significance of broadly defined demographics found throughout our analyses
suggests the merit of careful attention to the demographic characteristics that drive movie
theatre attendance.  Table 9 presents estimation results of the core estimations of
Equation 11, replacing the average measures of income and age with percentages of the
population falling within various income and age classifications.  We do not correct for
spatial autocorrelation in this analysis since earlier results indicated that the extent of
spatial correlation is not statistically significant.  Further, we add a variable to control for
gender, and we introduce median property values as an alternative measure for the wealth
of the population.  In the reported regressions all demographics are measured within a 5-
mile radius of each theatre.22
When MEAN INCOME is replaced by the percentage of the population whose
income is above a particular threshold ($35,000, $75,000, and $100,000), we uncover a
more detailed picture of how income influences film attendance.  As the percentage of
the population increases in any one of these three income classifications, movie
attendance is positively and significantly impacted at the .01 significance level, as shown
in Regressions II, III, and IV.  These results together provide evidence that movies are
normal goods throughout the income distribution.
The conventional industry claim that young male viewers drive the demand for
movies is not supported by our data.  Neither the age distribution nor the percentage of
population that is male is a statistically significant predictor of movie attendance.  These
results, combined with our earlier analysis, suggest that while population size (as
measured by number of households) and income are significant factors in determining
movie attendance, spatial and product attributes influence the demand for movies more
than age and gender demographics.
IV. Conclusion
In order to understand important industrial economic decisions, such as product design,
location choice, and degree of product differentiation, we must identify the theoretical
and empirical determinants of demand.  This study of the motion-pictures theatrical
market examines a prominent U.S. industry and extensively documents its demand
foundations.  It develops insights into several fundamental questions relevant to
consumer choice in the face of significant spatial and physical product differentiation.23
Our empirical analysis is based on a two-stage model of consumer choice
motivated by developments in modern economic geography that explicitly incorporate
product differentiation and demand heterogeneity.  The resulting estimates present
evidence that both competition and market-share effects are important influences on
demand at a particular movie theatre.  Our data further suggest that demand is affected by
relative physical attributes: in the movie theatre case, by the type of sound system and the
quality of seating offered by competing theatres. Our analysis provides additional
evidence that the adoption of new technologies depends on the demonstrated impact of
innovation on demand.  Finally, our demographic analysis demonstrates support for
some, but not all, industry priors on the empirical determinants of demand.  In particular,
while movie attendance appears to be a normal good at all income levels, we find no
evidence that the proportion of young males within a particular market significantly
impacts demand.
Our study points to promising new avenues for future research.  First, our analysis
can be extended to wider markets within the motion-pictures industry and to other
industries characterized by significant spatial and physical product differentiation,
including the airlines industry, the fast-food industry, and hospitality services.  Second,
our estimations of demand can serve as a basis for explicitly modeling location choice.
Finally, our results suggest that further study of differentiation within the motion-pictures
theatrical market in the form of film-programming choice will enhance our understanding
of how relative and absolute product attributes influence consumer choice.Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by Metropolitan Market
Boston Metro. and Surrounding Area South Florida Metro. and Surrounding Area
Variable 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
T o t a l  N u m b e r  o f  T h e a t r e s 5 96 16 36 36 37 27 47 77 56 7
Total Number of Screens 394 443 481 484 510 628 649 739 753 727
N u m b e r  o f  M e g a p l e x  T h e a t r e s 1 31 61 91 92 11 51 62 22 52 8
Number of Megaplex Screens 180 221 271 271 304 244 260 371 431 489
Number of Stadium Theatres 4 7 10 11 13 9 10 15 18 21
Number of Stadium Screens 57 98 148 154 187 147 163 274 334 392
N u m b e r  o f  N e w  T h e a t r e s  A d d e d3471222533
Number of New Screens Added 19 46 66 6 33 32 21 111 60 58
Number of New Megaplex
Theatres
0330221633
Number of New Megaplex Screens 0 41 50 0 33 32 16 111 60 58
N u m b e r  o f  N e w  S t a d i u m  T h e a t r e s 1331211533
Number of New Stadium Screens 7 41 50 6 33 18 16 111 60 58Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Year for All Open Theatres Reporting Revenues to E.D.I.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Variable Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
TIX PER SCREEN .039 .022 .040 .024 .039 .030 .036 .024 .034 .022
SCREENS 8.43 4.30 8.75 4.34 9.92 5.13 10.09 5.46 10.47 5.79
REAL REVENUE 1.18 0.90 1.26 0.96 1.32 1.04 1.38 1.36 1.36 1.41
DISTANCE1 3.73 3.30 3.68 3.11 3.49 3.52 3.63 3.53 3.55 3.56
DISTANCE2 6.31 4.39 6.16 4.15 6.09 4.52 6.31 4.96 6.24 4.70
DISTANCE3 8.37 6.72 8.17 6.58 7.91 6.45 8.21 7.97 8.14 6.84
STADIUM 0.25 0.43 0.31 0.46
DOLBY 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25
DIGITAL 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.50
THEATRES N=107 N=108 N=115 N=118 N=116
Tickets per screen are measured in millions of tickets per screen.
Real revenue is measured in millions of 1982-84 dollars.
Distances measure the distance to the first-, second-, and third-closest theatre of the same type.
Stadium, Dolby, and Digital are dummies equal to 1 if a theatre has an attribute; 0 otherwise.  Because theatres closed or were renovated during the earlier
period of our period of study, reliable attributes data are from 1999 and 2000.Table 3:  Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of 2000 Linear Demand for Movies
Demographics from 3-Mile, 5-Mile, and 10-Mile Radii for Each Theatre
Three Closest Theatres of Same Type Three Closest Theatres of Any Type


























































































































2 0.48003 0.48083 0.46674 0.46390 0.45779 0.44333
Breusch-Pagan 16.9506 17.7015 17.0170 14.1038 15.4667 13.1003
Dependent variable is tickets per screen sold in 2000.  Significance levels *.10, **.05, ***.01;  t-ratios in parentheses.  Sample size is 116.  Results corrected
for heteroskedacticity.Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of 2000 Linear Demand for Movies
Controlling for Spatial Autocorrelation
Demographics from 3-Mile, 5-Mile, and 10-Mile Radii for Each Theatre
Three Closest Theatres of Same Type Three Closest Theatres of Any Type






































































































































2 0.4805 0.4806 0.4669 0.4633 0.4565 0.4439
Dependent variable is tickets per screen sold in 2000.  λ is spatial autocorrelation coefficient.
Significance levels *.10, **.05, ***.01; z-values in parentheses.  Sample size is 116.Table 5:  Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of 2000 Linear Demand for Movies
Controlling for Proximity to Regional Malls
Demographics from 3-Mile, 5-Mile, and 10-Mile Radii for Each Theatre
Three Closest Theatres of Same Type Three Closest Theatres of Any Type






































































































































2 0.48685 0.49147 0.48335 0.47510 0.47388 0.46478
Breusch-Pagan 18.4726 19.7772 18.0305 16.4394 18.2956 16.1161
Dependent variable is tickets per screen sold in 2000.  Significance levels *.10, **.05, ***.01;  t-ratios in parentheses.  Sample size is 116.  Results corrected
for heteroskedacticity.  The mall variable equals 1 if a regional mall is located within a 2-mile radius of a given theatre, and 0 otherwise.Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of Linear Demand for Movies: 1996-1999

















































































Sample Size 107 108 115 118
R
2 0.30352 0.22474 0.17096 0.42573
Breusch-Pagan 25.7184 49.4339 164.8558 57.2118
Dependent variable is tickets per screen sold in each year.
Demographics are from 5-mile radii around each theatre.
Distances are to three closest theatres of same type.
Significance levels *.10, **.05, ***.01; t-ratios in parentheses.
Results corrected for heteroskedacticity.Table 7: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Linear Demand for Movies: 1996-1999
Controlling for Spatial Autocorrelation

























































































Sample Size 107 108 115 118
R
2 0.3104 0.2122 0.1717 0.4245
Dependent variable is tickets per screen sold in each year.
Demographics are from 5-mile radii around each theatre.
Distances are to three closest theatres of same type.
λ is spatial autocorrelation coefficient.
Significance levels *.10, **.05, ***.01; z-values in parentheses.Table 8: Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of 1999 and 2000 Linear Demand for Movies













































































2 0.38167 0.36960 0.41293 0.39961
Breusch-Pagan 55.0651 52.4798 23.3720 19.9363
Dependent variable is tickets per screen sold in each year.
Demographics are from 5-mile radii around each theatre.
Distances are to three closest theatres of any type.
Digital comparison variable equals 1 if a given theatre has the digital sound attribute but its nearest neighbor does
not; 0 if both theatres either have the digital sound attribute or do not have the attribute; and -1 if a given theatre
does not have the digital sound attribute but its nearest neighbor does.
Significance levels *.10, **.05, ***.01; t-ratios in parentheses.
Sample size is 118 and 116 for 1999 and 2000, respectively.
Results corrected for heteroskedacticity.Table 9: Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of 2000 Linear Demand for Movies
Extended Demographic Analysis


























































































































2 0.48805 0.48754 0.49889 0.49540 0.47338
Breusch-Pagan 21.4373 21.4242 20.7701 19.9757 20.4204
Dependent variable is tickets per screen sold in 2000. Sample size is 116.  Distances are to three closest theatres of same type.  Demographics are from 5-mile radii around each theatre.
Significance levels *.10, **.05, ***.01; t-ratios in parentheses.  Results corrected for heteroskedacticity.REFERENCES
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